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Abstract 
 
Do locally hired teachers benefit pupils’ school achievements more than governmental employed 
teachers? In Republic of Kenya (below referred as Kenya), there are two types of teachers in public 
primary schools. One is those employed by the government and the other is those hired by the local 
school community, named “PTA teacher”. Though locally hired teachers are in general less qualified in 
terms of educational background and paid substantially lower than that of governmentally employed 
teachers, past randomized experiment results show that the marginal product in terms of test score is 
positive and significant when pupils are taught by PTA teachers (Duflo et al. 2012, and Bold et al., 
2013).  
 
By using a nationally representative rich data set, with the Generalized propensity score matching 
method, the present study examines the effect of PTA teacher ratio (ratio of PTA teachers out of total 
number of teachers) on education outcome. The question of this study is “if PTA teachers have 
superior performance, proved by the Randomized Controlled trial in Kenya, should higher PTA 
teacher ratio in one school bring better educational outputs?”. With the nationally representative 
dataset containing rich educational school inputs as well as individual pupils’ background and 
household information, this paper estimates the dose response function of school average outcomes. 
Provided that government teachers’ allocation and school selection by the parents can be an 
endogenous to pupils’ school outcomes, this paper utilizes the generalized propensity score method by 
Hirano and Imbens (2004) which enable us to estimate the function of the continuous treatment effect, 
PTA teacher ratio. The result consistently shows that the PTA teacher ratio affects school outcomes 
nonlinearly.  
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1．Introduction  
One of the significant improvements in education sector for the past two decades is drastic increase in 
enrollment of primary school pupils in developing countries. According to the UNESCO Institute of 
Statistics (UIS) reports, the out of school children in the world has greatly reduced from 100 million to 
58 million as of 2012 since 2000 (UIS, 2014)
1
. At the same time, facing the sudden increase in 
enrollment of primary school pupils, supply side was not kept up with the pace, especially supply of 
teachers. After the Free Primary Education policy, how to supply school teachers has become one of 
the substantial topics in education sector. Within the limited budget, various developing countries were 
to introduce the system of “contract teachers”. For example, in 11 west African countries, on average, 
nearly 50% of primary school teachers were contract teachers (Bourdon et al., 2007). In Kenya, 
though there is no official figure for the number of PTA teachers, it is on average 20% of teachers in 
schools employed by the PTA (Alice Muthoni, 2010, Uwezo Kenya, 2010)
2
.  
 
The characteristics of contract teachers are with shorter term contract and in general with lower 
qualifications than that of governmentally hired teachers (Duthilleul 2005). For example, half of the 
PTA teachers in Kenya have a Primary 1 (P1) certificate as their highest qualifications, whereas 20% 
had no formal qualifications. On the other hand, 79% of the governmentally employed teachers had P1 
qualifications (Alice Muthoni, 2010). In terms of the cost, the PTA teachers are paid substantially 
lower, which is one forth of that of governmentally employed teachers (Duflo et al., 2012, Alice 
Muthoni, 2010).  
 
                                                   
1 Substantial reduction was found in south and west part of Asia from 2000 to 2012 and the 
half of the entire out of children as of 2012 is concentrated in sub-Sahara Africa. A significant 
decline in the number of out of school children is mainly due to the “Free Primary Education” 
policy introduction (UIS, 2014). 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/FactSheets/Documents/fs-28-out-of-school-children-en.pdf 
2 This figure varies slightly with sources. One report approximates 17.5% of teachers are paid by 
the PTA (Alice Muthoni, 2010) and the other repot says on average, 1 out of 5 teachers are employed 
by the PTA (Uwezo Kenya, 2010).  
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While it is obvious that hiring PTA teachers is less costly, past experiments show that performance is 
not lower than the government employed teachers. The performance of these contract teachers is 
empirically studied, based both on the randomized experiment and by observational data (Atherton 
and Kingdon 2015, Bold et al., 2013, Muralidharan and Sundaraman 2013, Duflo et al., 2012, 
Bourdon et al., 2010, Duthilleul 2005, and Vegas and De Laat 2003). Experimental evidence infers 
that PTA teachers cause better educational outcomes measured by test score in Kenya (Duflo et 
al.,2012) . In India, marginal effect of randomly allocating local teacher raises test score with 
statistical significance. As the experimental evidence in Kenya and India, it shows that PTA teacher is 
as good as or better than the government employed teachers. Then, if PTA teachers are superior in 
teaching, should all teachers be replaced by PTA teachers?. The more PTA teachers in one school 
would bring better educational outcomes on average?”. The cost of hiring PTA teachers is substantially 
lower than government teachers, the question is important to be answered. Provided that PTA teachers’ 
allocation within a school could be an endogenous to pupils’ school outcomes, this paper is to 
investigate the aggregated effect of PTA teachers, that is, the ratio of PTA teachers (the number of PTA 
teachers out of total teachers in one school) on pupils’ school outcomes. 
 
2. Preceding Studies 
Regardless of highly important policy implications, publications solely dealing with locally hired 
“contract teacher” effect is scarce (Atherton and Kingdon 2015, Bold et al., 2013, Muralidharan and 
Sundaraman 2013, Duflo et al., 2012, Bourdon et al., 2010, Duthilleul 2005, and Vegas and De Laat 
2003). For the causal inference, randomized controlled experiments were conducted in two 
countries and both indicate that PTA teachers’ effect on school outcomes is positive and 
significant3. On the other hand, in observational studies, Atherton and Kingdon (2010) 
                                                   
3 Duflo et al. (2012) has shown that the pupils taught by PTA teachers have significantly 
increased test scores, compared to those taught by government hired teachers. Bold et al. 
(2013) also shows the result of randomization controlled trials in Kenya that the test scores of 
pupils taught by the PTA teachers have significantly increased when the program was 
implemented by an International NGOs. Muralidharan and Sundaraman (2013) have showed that 
the randomly assigned contract teachers in India contribute the increase of test scores, 
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reports that by school fixed estimation method, contract teachers in North India are no less 
effective on school test scores than regular teachers. On the other hand, Vegas and De Laat 
(2003) show that contract teacher performance is systematically underperformed, using 
samples from Togo, while Bourdon, J. et al. (2010) shows that, by using observational data for Niger, 
Togo and Mali with nonparametric quantile regression estimation, the average treatment effect as well 
as the effect on a certain quantile are not consistently positive among three countries. 
 
In this way, while the experimental result shows that the impact of PTA teacher deployment raises test 
score, observational studies have the mixed result. The contribution that this paper makes on the past 
literature is as follows: First, this study is to focus on the effect of “existing” PTA teachers on pupils’ 
school outcome, not to measure the marginal effect of “newly” hired or “randomly” deployed teacher. 
It is worth noting that there is significant difference between newly deployed teacher by the 
experiment and existing PTA teachers regularly paid by school communities. The nature of existing 
PTA teachers is largely differed in the contract and payment scheme from the one of experiment 
deployed teachers, which would greatly affect working motivation and effort level of teachers. As one 
forth of total teachers are existing PTA teachers in Kenya, the nature of the contract and payment 
scheme would greatly affect the working incentive of teachers. For this reason, the present study uses 
the observational data. 
 
For the use of observational data, obstacles exist in identification due to two types of unobserved 
heterogeneity which affect the school outcomes. One is the unobserved heterogeneity among schools 
and the other is the unobserved heterogeneity within a school. For the former heterogeneity, for 
example, government prioritizes in allocating teachers to schools where pupils with higher test scores 
are resident in and parents who are aware of school outcomes might self-select schools with less PTA 
                                                                                                                                                               
through reducing the PTR (pupil teacher ratio). The result is that the effect of PTR reduction 
by contract teachers is not less effective to the test scores as reduction by regular teacher. 
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teachers. The identification strategy of this paper must rely on the assumption that the selection into 
schools with different PTA teacher ratio is random, conditional on the covariates. To sufficiently 
remove the heterogeneity among schools with different PTA teacher ratio, this paper uses one of the 
largest dataset existing in East African countries, which contains various educational inputs for schools 
and household levels. The specification of propensity score does include the 23 covariates and 157 
district level dummies so that the unobserved heterogeneity between different PTA teacher ratio 
schools would be removed. By putting the conditional independence assumption that school average 
test scores are independent from the PTA teacher ratio conditioned on the rich covariates, the paper 
identify the treatment effect on test scores. As the propensity score matching method (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983) is often utilized in the empirical works, the paper uses the extended propensity score 
method by Hirano and Imbens (2004) for the case that treatment is continuous. Our treatment, PTA 
teacher ratio does not take binary value but takes continuous values. In order to estimate the 
continuous treatment effect, the extended propensity score method is suggested (Imbens, 2000; Hirano 
and Imbens, 2004; Imai and van Dyk, 2004). By using the framework of extended propensity score 
method, this paper estimates the function of different treatment effect.  
 
For the latter unobserved heterogeneity is within a school; for example, the assignment of PTA or TSC 
teachers is not presumably random and pupils might be systematically sorted into particular type of 
teachers without being observed. If TSC teachers are systematically assigned to higher score pupils, 
then the effect of PTA teacher is estimated downward. Even in the case of randomized experiment, 
when there is unobserved sorting process of pupils into different type of teachers (Bold et al., 2013), it 
becomes serious obstacle to the identification, explained in detailed by Muralidharan and Sundaraman 
(2013). In order to avoid the unobserved heterogeneity within a school, the present study focuses on 
the school level aggregated variable, the ratio of PTA teacher. 
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The second contribution is that the present study uses observations from geographically broad area 
with larger sample size. As for the experimental studies, two experiments were conducted in 
Kenya. One is in 140 primary schools in Western province and the other is in 192 schools in 
eight provinces (Duflo et al., 2012 and Bold et al., 2013), while for India, the sample was taken 
from 200 primary schools in one state (Muralidharan and Sundaraman 2013). The present study 
uses the nationally representing dataset containing 4,789 primary schools in all eight provinces
4
. 
Broader geographical coverage is preferred, since the heterogeneity of region is not ignorable. From 
this respect, the present paper contributes the past literature to confirm whether the estimated result is 
still valid even considering the geographical diversity. 
 
3. Characteristics of Teachers in Public Primary Schools in Kenya 
Present data does not have variables of characteristics of teachers such as age, years of education and 
experiences; however this section qualitatively describes the differences in general between the PTA 
and TSC teachers.  
i) The employment of TSC teachers 
As for the hiring and firing authority for TSC teachers, it is highly concentrated in the institutions 
called the Teacher Service Commission (TSC), delegated from the Ministry of Education Science and 
Technology (MoEST). In order for teachers to be certified by the TSC, one needs to acquire academic 
qualifications, ranging from the graduates of primary schools to Diploma. If non-graduate wishes to be 
a TSC certified teacher, they need to acquire a relevant degree or qualification from a recognized 
institution (UNESCO 2010). There are 25 public and 8 private colleges for training primary school 
teachers. Once they become certified TSC teachers because of the protective laws and union, it is 
unlikely to get fired (Duflo et al., 2012, Glewwe et al., 2010). On the other hand, PTA teachers are 
hired by the school community, parents and other school members such as headmasters. With scarce 
                                                   
4 In the estimation, we use the sample restricted for schools with positive value of PTA 
teacher ratio. Hence, the total effective sample size is reduced to 3778 primary schools for 4th 
grade pupils, 3728 schools for 3rd and 3706 schools for 2nd.  
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qualitative information, it is often the case that PTA teachers’ contract is annually renewable based on 
their performance.  
 
ii) Monitoring on teachers 
According to the laws and regulations of governmental monitoring policies, the work of government 
teachers is principally monitored by the District of Education Office (DEO)
5
. However, as qualitative 
studies explained, due to the large number of schools in one district, district education officers are lack 
of resources in mobilizing the monitoring school teachers (Omuga Thomas 2009, James Kariuki 2010, 
John Ogamba et al., 2013). For example, it is articulated that the “comprehensive standard assessment 
of all educational institutions be carried out by external Quality Assurance and Standards Officers 
(QASOs) at least once every term for primary schools” (James Kariuki, 2010)6. However, the table [1] 
shows merely 39% of the entire visits are confirmed by the headmaster during the term from January 
to March 2012. The table [1] shows the number and percentage of schools that answers how many 
months have passed since the previous Quality Assurance Officer visit
7
. In Kenya, there is a trimester 
system. The first term starts from January to March, the second from May to July and the last term 
starts from September to November. Although the regulation articulates the assurance officer must 
visit schools at least once in the term, 61% visits were made before January 2012, including 30% of 
missing information. When the previous term from September to November in 2011 included, it 
becomes 53% of the total officers’ visit. The rest of nearly half of the visits were either done before 
August of 2011, which is two terms before the surveyed or unknown about when the inspections 
made.  
                                                   
5 In Kenya, country is divided into eight administrative regions (known as provinces) where each province 
has a Provincial Director of Education Office. In each province, there are districts, and in total 158 districts 
exist in the entire land and District of Education Office is (DEO) in charge of the monitoring of schools. 
6 The department of Quality Assurance and Standards (DQAS) was established in 2004, and 
its’ mandate of this department is to ensure quality and standards in Kenya with the vision of “to provide 
quality assurance feedback to all educational institutions in Kenya.” The Ministry of Education service 
charter (2009) and the DOAS circular 2/1A/Vol.II/86 of 2009 states the frequency of the external quality 
assurance (James Kariuki, 2010). 
7
 Out of 4,234 schools that 2012 dataset contains, the effective answers are from 2,968 schools and 
29.9% of schools have missing information. 
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Table [1] 
 
Not only has the monitoring from the government, but also from the school community on TSC 
teachers become less since the introduction of the FPE (Free Primary Education) policy in 2003. 
Qualitative studies explain that before the policy, school communities were in charge of collecting 
school fees from parents and were entitled to decide how to spend the collected money. In that time, 
teachers were obliged to be accountable to payers, that is, parents and school community. However 
after introducing the FPE (Free Primary Education) policy, schools need to be more accountable to the 
District of Education Office as well as to the Central Government which decides the allocation of the 
capitation fund (Sasaoka et al. 2007). In this way, while the Free Primary Education has succeeded in 
assisting low income parents to send their children to school, however it happened to deprive the 
interest of parents to manage schools or incentive to monitor schools (Sawamura 2004a).  
 
iii) Wage payment scheme 
In addition to the employment and monitoring teachers, the determination of wage level is clearly 
different between two teachers. In developing countries, salaries and promotion of civil servants are 
likely to be decided by educational qualifications and seniority, with less scope of performance 
(Chaudhury et al. 2006). In Kenya, the wage for TSC teachers is determined by education history, not 
by their performance (Sawamura 2004b). As for PTA teachers, although the wage level of PTA teacher 
depends on schools, it is determined by the school local community who can directly verify the 
performance of teachers. The amount of wage for PTA teachers is substantially lower than that of TSC 
teachers. One report indicates that the average payment for PTA teachers is 4,151 Kenya Shillings, 
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which is one fourth of the average salary 19,372 Kenya Shillings of the TSC teachers (Alice Muthoni, 
2010)
8
.  
 
4. Data 
This paper uses dataset of UWEZO Kenya, a part of Twaweza, “an independent East African initiative” 
(UWEZO East Africa 2012), which conducted one of the largest national assessments in three eastern 
African countries for individual, school and local community. The annual national assessment survey 
was conducted in three countries, namely Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, to assess the basic 
competency of numeracy and literacy for children aged from six to sixteen. For the 2012 assessment in 
three east African countries, 350,000 children in over 150,000 households were tested in ability of 
tasks at the Standard 2 level (UWEZO East Africa 2012). Specifically in Kenya, 2012 UWEZO annual 
assessment covers 156 districts out of 158 (census) districts, which becomes 153,900 children assessed 
from 90,820 households, and 4,543 primary schools, that is, 20 percent of Kenya public primary 
schools surveyed at the same time so that surveyed pupils and household information as well as school 
information are merged at one dataset (UWEZO Kenya 2012). 
 
Sampling methodology is based on the Census frame and the district is the main stratum
9
. Inside the 
district, there are 30 villages randomly selected and at least one public primary school per village is 
included. Within a village, 20 households are randomly selected and for the selection, it does not 
matter whether their children are attending the surveyed schools or not. All children are tested in their 
household environment and no tests are examined at their schools, hence children both attending and 
not attending schools are included. 
 
There were three rounds of the national annual assessments in Kenya since UWEZO started to conduct 
survey in 2009. The geographical coverage has been expanded since 2009 as table [2] shows in 
detailed. The first round was in 2009 (70 districts covered), the second in 2011 (124 districts covered) 
and the third round was conducted in 2012 (156 districts covered out of the 158). Per district, it is a 
rotational panel with 10 villages newly replaced each year and 20 villages are remained. As for the 
schools, the remained 20 primary schools per district may or may not be changed for the following 
                                                   
8
 It slightly varies from different sources. Duflo et al. (2012) reports the wage for PTA teachers as of 2004 
is in the rage of 2000 Kenyan shilling, while that of the average civil service teacher is US$ 120 per month 
plus benefits and allowance (Duflo et al., 2012). 
9 The detailed sampling methodology is written in the report available from the website (Standard 
Manual, Uwezo East Africa at Twaweza, Kenya).  
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year. Hence, though 20 villages are overlapped for two consecutive years, those 20 primary schools 
per district are not necessarily paneled. In this way, the number of overlapped effective schools from 
year 2011 to 2012 is small, in number 372 schools available in dataset
10
. Therefore, the present study 
does not apply the panel data analysis; rather the pooled data of two consecutive years and our unit of 
observations is at school level
11
. The variables included in estimations are as follows; 
 
Table [2]  
 
1) Independent Variables  
Subjects of Swahili, English and Numeracy were scored at the time of household survey. Score of 
Swahili and English is rated from 1 to 5 while Numeracy is rated from 1 to 8
12
. Following variables 
are selected as controlling covariates, based on past studies of education production literature.  
 
2) Class size, Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR) and PTA teacher ratio variables 
Since PTA teachers are often hired by school community to compensate the shortage of deployed 
government teachers (TSC teachers), without controlling the effect of shortage of teachers and pupil 
teacher ratio, PTA teacher ratio is only to capture the effect of large class size or large number of 
pupils per one teacher. To control the effect, pupil teacher ratio (PTR) and class size are included. As 
those above variables are skewed to the right, they are converted to logarithm and used in the 
estimation. 
 
3) Household and Pupil Variables 
Traditionally, the education production function literature assumes that the educational achievement is 
determined by the supply side such as school qualities or educational inputs and the demand side such 
as household characteristics. As for the demand side, it is assumed that the household takes the utility 
                                                   
10
 This is the number of primary schools which are overlapped from 2011 to 2012 and pupils grade below 4 
attend. Some schools do not have any children grade below 4, hence the number of overlapped schools becomes 
smaller. 
11
 The detailed effective samples selection process is in table in Appendix A. In the dataset, those attending the 
surveyed schools and grade lower than 4 are 35,642 for 2011 and 39,681 for 2012. Due to number of missing 
values in covariates, the effective samples for 2011 and 2012 pooled dataset become 47,812. The subsample of 
grade below 4 is somehow arbitrary, hence specifications based on the subsample of pupils grade above 5 and 
below 8 are shown in appendix B. Furthermore, the estimate based on the subsample with missing information 
drastically increases the sample size. The estimation with missing dummies yields qualitatively similar result and 
available from the author. 
12
 The level of score rate in each subject is as follows: As for Swahili and English, children can read 1. Nothing, 
2. Letter, 3. Words, 4. Paragraph, and 5. Story. As for Numeracy, children can do 1. Nothing, 2. count 1-9, 3. 
count 10-99, 4. count greater than 99, 5. calculate addition, 6. calculate subtraction, 7. calculate multiplication, 
and 8. calculate division. 
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maximizing behavior in choosing the optimal investment amount in children subject to the budget 
constraint. Hence, as proxies for wealth of a household, the asset variables were used, such as type of 
house wall and possession of telephone. Also, the literature finds that there might be a resource 
allocation issue about who to be invested most if the number of siblings is large. There is no variable 
for the number of siblings; however as the proxy variable, total number of household members is used 
to control the effect of resource competition.  
 
In terms of unobserved ability of children, though not possible to totally control the effect, there are 
variables to partially control the unobserved. The effect of parents’ education attainment is controlled 
by years of education for mother and father, which can directly affect unobserved ability of children. 
In order to control parents’ preference over children education, the variable whether parents pay tuition 
or extra fee to school is included. As for pupil characteristics, variables included are age and their 
school grade. The older they are, it becomes easier to take high score, since the test level is set for 
Standard grade two level. Pupils are aged from three to sixteen and grade from one to fourteen. 
Primary school pupils are from age five and grade one to grade eighth. Each age and grade category 
dummy is included for the fixed effect. To control the physical health, the number of meal in one day 
that pupil can take is also controlled.  
 
4) School Input Variables 
In the early study of education production function estimation, Heyneman and Loxley (1983) 
explained that “the poorer the national setting in economic terms, the more powerful this (school 
inputs and teacher quality) effect appears to be”. Since this “H-L effect” has been widely recognized 
and supported by several empirical results, this paper also controls the supply side information, 
including two variables for school inputs, in addition to PTR and class size. 1) Dummy variable if 
school has learning supplement materials or not. 2) Dummy variable if school is fenced or not, since 
the security in some areas is remained fragile after the large scale of post-election violence in 2007 
December. While there are various types of educational input variables available in UWEZO Kenya 
2012 and 2011 dataset, after most variables were tried to be included, however the coefficient of PTA 
teacher ratio is not largely affected. 
 
5) Village and District Variables 
It is often pointed out that there exist large disparities in terms of educational input between regions in 
Kenya. There are eight administrative regions in Kenya called Provinces and in each Province, there 
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are countless tribes and ethnic minorities live. It is rationally assumed that the cultural intensity affects 
the behavior of households and hence affects education attainment. In order to control the 
geographical characteristics and ethnic diversity, 157 district dummy variables are added for the 
district fixed effect. As for village characteristics where the school is located, the dummy variable of 
existence of paved roads and existence of electricity infrastructure are added.  
 
5. Summary statistics and common support condition 
Table [3.1] shows the summary statistics for the pupils in grade four before imposing the common 
support condition. Due to the limited space, the summary statistics for pupils in grade three and two is 
in appendix. To implement the propensity score method, it requires that there are sufficient number of 
schools which overlap the propensity score. It is because that propensity score matching relies on the 
assumption conditioned on the propensity score, the treatment is random to the outcome. Therefore, 
even those schools with different treatment levels, the generalized propensity score of estimation 
sample is sufficiently overlapped.  
 
Following the literature (Flores et al. 2012, Kluve et al. 2012), we divide the treatment level into 
quantile groups (25, 50, 75 and 100 percentile) and estimate the generalized propensity score using the 
medium value of each quantile group. In general, in order to examine the overlapping condition for 
quantile group “q”, we estimate the generalized propensity score ?̂?𝑖
𝑞 using the representative treatment 
value of the “q” group. In this paper, we use the medium value as the representative value of the group. 
Table 3.1 shows each quantile medium and mean value of the treatment and number of observations. 
As Flores et al. (2012) shows, the common support for quantile groups “q” is defined as follows. For 
example, how the common support condition imposed in the first quantile group is that minimum 
value of the estimated propensity score ?̂?𝑖
𝑞  must be greater than the minimum value of the rest of 
propensity score ?̂?𝑗
𝑞
, while the maxim value of the estimated propensity score ?̂?𝑖
𝑞
 should be smaller 
than the maximum value of the rest of propensity score ?̂?𝑗
𝑞
. Based on this definition, the effective sample 
size is reduced as table 3.2. Figure 1 shows the distribution of generalized propensity score after 
imposing the common support restriction and before
13
.  
 
𝐶𝑆𝑞 = {𝑖: ?̂?𝑖
𝑞 ∈ [𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑗:𝑄𝑗=𝑞}?̂?𝑗
𝑞,  𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑗:𝑄𝑗≠𝑞}?̂?𝑗
𝑞} , 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑗:𝑄𝑗=𝑞}?̂?𝑗
𝑞,  𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑗:𝑄𝑗≠𝑞}?̂?𝑗
𝑞}]} 
 
Table [3] 
                                                   
13 For the brevity, the histograms for the grade 3 and 2 samples are not shown. The shape is 
similar to the one of grade 4 school sample. It is available from author upon the request. 
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Table [3.1] 
Table [3.2] 
Figure 1 
 
6. Identification Strategy  
6.1 Estimation of the propensity score 
At first, the generalized propensity score is estimated by modeling the conditional distribution of 
treatment variable. Instead of putting the specific assumption of modeling of treatment variable, the 
paper uses more flexible modeling by the generalized linear models (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). 
The generalized linear models for treatment variable 𝑇𝑖 is unknown function “g” of the conditional 
expectation of treatment variable 𝑇𝑖 given covariates 𝑋𝑖 is linear combination of covariates with 
vector coefficients 𝛾. 
𝑔[𝐸(𝑇𝑖|𝑋𝑖)] = 𝑋𝑖𝛾 
There are various modeling available by choosing the distribution function 𝐹 as well as the functional 
form 𝑔. By comparing the model fitting, this paper uses the log-normal specification applied, based 
on the Akaike information criteria. The estimated coefficients vector is shown in table [4.1]. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖|𝑋𝑖) ~  𝑁{𝑋𝑖𝛾, 𝜎
2} 
As the definition of the generalized propensity score, the conditional density distribution of the 
treatment variable given covariates is as follows: 
𝑟(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝑓𝑇|𝑋(𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑥) 
Accordingly, the probability density function for the actual treatment level 𝑇𝑖 for the school i is 
estimated as follows. 
?̂?𝑖(𝑇𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) =
1
√2𝜋?̂?2
𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑒
𝑋𝑖?̂?)
2
2?̂?2
} 
 
For the given treatment level “t”, we also define the random variable ?̂?𝑖
𝑡
= 𝑟(𝑡, 𝑋𝑖). 
 
6.2 Balancing property of the propensity score 
The role of propensity score is to balance the difference between those schools in a certain treatment 
level and those that are not in the same treatment level. To articulate in formula, given the certain 
treatment value of “t”, the observed covariates are independent from whether it takes the value of “t” 
or not, conditioned on the propensity score given the treatment level “t”. 
 
𝑋𝑖 ⊥ 1{𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡}|𝑟(𝑡, 𝑋𝑖) 
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To confirm this balancing property of the propensity score satisfied, the literature has suggested 
number of ways. Hirano and Imbens (2004) suggest ‘blocking on the score’ and divide the sample into 
three different groups according to the distribution of treatment level. This paper uses the blocking on 
the score method and treatment level is divided into three groups as follows. 
1) {0 < 𝑃𝑇𝐴 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ≤ 16} 
2) {16 < 𝑃𝑇𝐴 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ≤ 26} 
3) {26 < 𝑃𝑇𝐴 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ≤ 100} 
 
In each group, taking the mean value as the representative value of the group, the generalized 
propensity score is estimated ?̂?𝑖
𝑡
= 𝑟(𝑡, 𝑋𝑖), given the mean level of the treatment level. This 
estimated propensity score is divided into five intervals (20, 40, 60, 80, 99 percentile) and each 
interval, it is confirmed whether the covariates are well balanced or not among the different groups. 
For example, if the mean value of the treatment in 1) is 10 percent, using the value of 10 percent, the 
propensity score is estimated and divided into 5 intervals. The covariates should be balanced in the 
same interval, regardless of the fact the school belongs to the group 1) or to the other two groups. 
More concretely, this blocking on the score method is to examine whether the mean of the covariates 
are not statistically different each other as long as they are similar in generalized propensity score 
value.  
 
Table [4.2] shows that compared to the covariates without conditioning on the propensity score,  
the balancing property is mostly satisfied for those conditioned. For example, when we compare the 
first treatment level (PTA teacher ratio is below 16 percent) with the rest of the schools, the mean of 
all covariates except 5 out of 23 variables are significantly different. At the same time, when we 
compare the last treatment interval group (PTA teacher ratio is over 26 percent), covariates except 7 
are significantly different from zero. In this way, we find that without conditioning the propensity 
score, mean of each covariate does differ between the treatment levels. However, once we conditioned 
on the propensity score, no statistical significant difference is observed between treatment levels.  
 
7. Estimation result for the dose response function 
After estimated the generalized propensity score ?̂?𝑖(𝑇𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) with the actual treatment value 𝑇𝑖, the 
school outcome is modeled as the linear function of treatment value as well as the estimated 
propensity score as follows. As emphasized by the Hirano and Imbens (2004), the estimated 
- 14 - 
 
coefficient vectors α̂ does not have any interpretation of causal effect of treatment on outcome 
variable.  
 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑇𝑖, 𝑅𝑖] = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑖
2 + 𝛼3𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑖
2 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑖 
 
By storing the coefficient vectors, to estimate the dose response function at the particular level of the 
treatment “t”, the conditional expectation is averaged over the generalized propensity score for the 
fixed value of “t”, 𝑟(𝑡, 𝑋𝑖). Therefore, for the given treatment level “t”, the estimated average 
potential outcome is formulated as follows. 
 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖(𝑡)]̂ =
1
𝑁
∑(𝛼?̂? + 𝛼1̂𝑡 + 𝛼2̂𝑡
2 + 𝛼3̂𝑅𝑖,?̂? + 𝛼4̂𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2̂ + 𝛼5̂𝑅𝑖,?̂? ∗ 𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
7.1 The Does response function (DRF) estimation 
The DRF is estimated at each percent point of PTA teacher ratio for three subjects, Numeracy, English 
and Swahili. The scale of Numeracy is ranged from 1 to 8 point, while scores of English and Swahili 
are ranged from 1 to 5. Looking at the estimated DRF for pupils in Figure 2, 3, and 4, it is apparent 
that the PTA teacher ratio is not only nonlinear to the school average test score for three subjects, but 
each subject has different percent point that generates the lowest test score. For example, the score of 
Numeracy for grade 4 pupils is lowest around 60 percent PTA teacher ratio, while, after reaching the 
lowest test score around 30 percent, English and Swahili subject start to raise the test score as PTA 
teacher ratio increases. As for the grade three, the test score of Numeracy subject is highest around 10 
percent and goes down to the lowest at the point of 46 to 52 percent. The Numeracy test score starts to 
recover above 55 percent of ratio. In the grade two pupils, it is more obvious that test score is 
nonlinearly affected by the PTA teacher ratio. As for the Numeracy, there are two peaks observed; the 
first peak is at 10 to 20 percent and the second peak is from 70 to 80 percent. Both scores in grade 
three and grade two show that Swahili test score is overall higher than the English score and estimated 
response function shape is similar, the score difference between English and Swahili is smaller in 
grade two pupils.  
 
7.2 Regional heterogeneity 
As the past literature of randomized controlled trials has proved that the positive effect on test score of 
pupils by PTA teachers in Western province in Kenya (Duflo et al. 2012), the present paper shows the 
heterogeneity of 7 regions in Kenya. The figures 5 to 11 show the estimated school average outcome 
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response function of PTA teacher ratio at each percent point from 1 to 100 percent. The first obvious 
evidence is that it is heterogeneous among regions in terms of the shapes. For example, the mean and 
medium largely differ each other and the number of peaks differs among regions.  
 
8. Interpretation and Policy Implication and further studies 
The empirical results of dose response function are to show that treatment variable, that is, PTA 
teacher ratio nonlinearly affects the school outcome of pupils. This is intuitively reasonable result that 
the schools with 90 percent of PTA teacher are not the same effect on the schools with 10 percent of 
PTA teacher. This is the main contribution of this paper. Thought the existing literature of randomized 
controlled trials has found the PTA teacher brings positive and statistical significant effect on school 
outcomes, this paper shows that the causal effect on school outcomes differs at each treatment percent. 
While the estimation of the derivatives of dose response function and the statistical significance of 
them is required, the discussion should be opened to the level of the treatment.  
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Table [1] The number and percentage of schools that answers how many months have passed since the 
previous Quality Assurance Officer visit 
 
 
 
 
Table [2] The UWEZO Kenya National Assessment Scale 
 
Annual Assessment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Survey Period October, 2009 February – 
March, 2011 
February – 
March, 2012 
Districts reached (of census 158) 70 124 156 
Households reached 40,386 72,106 90,820 
Children assessed 68,945 134,243 153,900 
Schools reached 2,030 3,574 4,543 
Source: UWEZO Kenya (2009), (2010), (2012) 
 
School
year
Number of
Months Month Freq. Percent Cum.
School
term
1 March 13 0.31 0.31
2 February 974 23 23.31
3 January 662 15.64 38.95
4 December 10 0.24 39.18
5 November 219 5.17 44.36
6 October 207 4.89 49.24
7 September 182 4.3 53.54
8 August 18 0.43 53.97
9 July 62 1.46 55.43
10 June 87 2.05 57.49
11 May 64 1.51 59
12 April 12 0.28 59.28
13 March 54 1.28 60.56
14 February 82 1.94 62.49
15 January 153 3.61 66.11
17 November 7 0.17 66.27
18 October 19 0.45 66.72
19 September 15 0.35 67.08
20 August 2 0.05 67.12
21 July 11 0.26 67.38
22 June 5 0.12 67.5
23 May 6 0.14 67.64
25 March 5 0.12 67.76
26 February 10 0.24 68
27 January 30 0.71 68.71
Year 2009 30 0.71 69.41
Year 2008 29 0.68 70.1
Missing 1,266 29.9 100
Total 4,234 100
Year 2010
Year 2011
Term 1
Term 3
Term 2
Term 1
Term 3
Term 2
Term 1
Year 2012
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Table [3] Descriptive statistics for Schools, village and pupils characteristics before imposing the common support condition 
 
 
 
Grade 4 Obs Mean Variance Std. Min Max
Dependent Variable
Math 3778 6.82 1.67 1.29 1 8
English 3778 4.08 0.77 0.88 1 5
Swahili 3778 4.19 0.78 0.88 1 5
Independent Variable (School level)
PTA teacher ratio 3778 26.98 439.33 20.96 2 100
Log of pupil teacher ratio 3778 3.50 0.33 0.58 0.69 6.86
Log of classsize 3778 3.60 0.22 0.46 0.81 6.58
School fenced dummy (1 if school is fenced and 0 otherwise) 3778 0.69 0.21 0.46 0.00 1.00
Log of pupil teacher ratio (Quadratic) 3778 12.60 21.12 4.60 0.48 47.05
Log of classsize (Quadratic) 3778 13.14 12.29 3.51 0.66 43.34
Log of pupil teacher ratio (Quadratic) 3778 46.72 873.94 29.56 0.33 322.77
Log of classsize (Quadratic) 3778 48.85 444.65 21.09 0.53 285.33
Independent Variable (Household level averaged at school)
Male household head 3778 0.76 0.13 0.36 0 1
Year dummy 3778 0.54 0.25 0.50 0 1
Age of mother 3778 35.95 41.16 6.42 18 75
Age of pupils 3778 10.64 2.03 1.43 6 16
Years of education for mother 3778 5.68 11.39 3.37 0 13
Years of education for father 3778 6.66 13.03 3.61 0 17
Asset (phone) 3778 0.63 0.16 0.40 0 1
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Polythene) 3778 0.01 0.00 0.06 0 1
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Iron sheet) 3778 0.07 0.05 0.23 0 1
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Timber) 3778 0.10 0.07 0.27 0 1
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Stone/bricks) 3778 0.17 0.12 0.34 0 1
Number of meals that pupils take in a day 3778 2.72 0.22 0.47 1 3
Payment to school extra tuition 3778 0.41 0.20 0.45 0 1
Number of household members 3778 6.84 3.95 1.99 1 24
Independent Variable (Village level)
Electricity dummy (1 if there is an electricity infrastructure in the
village and 0 otherwise) 3778 0.43 0.24 0.49 0 1
Tarmac road dummy (1 if there is a tarmac road and 0 otherwise) 3778 0.13 0.11 0.34 0 1
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Table [3.1] Schools before Common support condition imposed and after. 
 
Grade 4 Grade 3 Grade 2
Observation mediun mean Min Max Observation mediun mean Min Max Observation mediun mean Min Max
1st quantile 947 10 9.45301 3 13 1st quantile 944 10 9.443856 2 13 1st quantile 1004 10 9.959163 3 14
2nd quantile 1088 19 18.47059 14 22 2nd quantile 1051 19 18.50048 14 22 2nd quantile 959 20 18.96038 15 22
3rd quantile 978 28 28.1411 23 33 3rd quantile 961 27 27.99688 23 33 3rd quantile 970 27 28.02268 23 33
4th quantile 765 50 59.29804 35 100 4th quantile 772 50 59.28627 35 100 4th quantile 773 50 60.35058 35 100
3778 3728 3706
Observation mediun mean Min Max Observation mediun mean Min Max Observation mediun mean Min Max
1st quantile 947 10 9.45301 3 13 1st quantile 942 10 9.440552 3 13 1st quantile 1002 10 9.956088 3 14
2nd quantile 1083 19 18.47461 14 22 2nd quantile 1050 19.5 18.50286 14 22 2nd quantile 957 20 18.96029 15 22
3rd quantile 964 28 28.09647 23 33 3rd quantile 949 27 27.9568 23 33 3rd quantile 958 27 27.97495 23 33
4th quantile 571 44 47.71629 35 100 4th quantile 579 44 47.51813 35 100 4th quantile 567 44 48.37919 35 100
3565 3520 3484
Common support before
Common support after
Common support before
Common support after
Common support before
Common support after
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Table [3.2] Descriptive statistics for restricted schools satisfied with common support condition  
 
 
 
Grade 4 Obs Mean Variance Std. Min Max
Dependent Variable
Math 3565 6.82 1.68 1.29 1 8
English 3565 4.08 0.77 0.88 1 5
Swahili 3565 4.19 0.77 0.88 1 5
Independent Variable (School level)
PTA teacher ratio 3565 23.36 198.12 14.08 2 100
Log of pupil teacher ratio 3565 3.41 0.17 0.41 0.69 4.69
Log of classsize 3565 3.59 0.21 0.46 0.81 6.58
School fenced dummy (1 if school is fenced and 0 otherwise) 3565 0.69 0.21 0.46 0.00 1.00
Log of pupil teacher ratio (Quadratic) 3565 11.82 7.59 2.76 0.48 21.99
Log of classsize (Quadratic) 3565 13.08 12.08 3.48 0.66 43.34
Log of pupil teacher ratio (Quadratic) 3565 41.46 202.60 14.23 0.33 103.13
Log of classsize (Quadratic) 3565 48.51 429.55 20.73 0.53 285.33
Independent Variable (Household level averaged at school)
Male household head 3565 0.76 0.13 0.36 0 1
Year dummy 3565 0.56 0.25 0.50 0 1
Age of mother 3565 35.96 41.34 6.43 18 75
Age of pupils 3565 10.63 2.02 1.42 6 16
Years of education for mother 3565 5.71 11.34 3.37 0 13
Years of education for father 3565 6.70 12.94 3.60 0 17
Asset (phone) 3565 0.63 0.16 0.40 0 1
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Polythene) 3565 0.01 0.00 0.06 0 1
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Iron sheet) 3565 0.07 0.05 0.23 0 1
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Timber) 3565 0.10 0.08 0.27 0 1
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Stone/bricks) 3565 0.18 0.12 0.35 0 1
Number of meals that pupils take in a day 3565 2.72 0.22 0.47 1 3
Payment to school extra tuition 3565 0.41 0.20 0.45 0 1
Number of household members 3565 6.84 3.97 1.99 1 24
Independent Variable (Village level)
Electricity dummy (1 if there is an electricity infrastructure in the village and 0
otherwise) 3565 0.43 0.25 0.50 0 1
Tarmac road dummy (1 if there is a tarmac road and 0 otherwise) 3565 0.13 0.12 0.34 0 1
23 
 
Figure 1 Histogram of generalized propensity score of grade 4 sample before imposing the common support condition and after 
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[ 3rd quantile group] 
 
 
[ 4th quantile group] 
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Table [4.1] Generalized propensity score estimation result (157 district dummy is included) 
 
Dependent Variable: PTA teacher ratio Grade Grade Grade 
four three two
Male household head -0.0251 0.0136 -0.00109
(0.0230) (0.0229) (0.0224)
Year dummy -0.0262 -0.00728 -0.0225
(0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0200)
Age of mother -0.00173 -0.000902 -0.00143
(0.00127) (0.00129) (0.00127)
Age of pupils 0.00476 0.00494 0.0162***
(0.00558) (0.00555) (0.00575)
Years of education for mother -0.00118 -0.00166 -0.00404
(0.00372) (0.00388) (0.00386)
Years of education for father -0.00797** -0.00666* 0.00227
(0.00320) (0.00353) (0.00350)
Asset (phone) -0.0438** -0.0427** -0.108***
(0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0211)
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Polythene) 0.279** 0.0126 -0.143
(0.115) (0.114) (0.0906)
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Iron sheet) 0.0386 0.0216 -0.0894**
(0.0363) (0.0383) (0.0391)
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Timber) 0.0938** -0.00133 -0.0160
(0.0428) (0.0465) (0.0429)
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Stone/bricks) -0.0432 -0.163*** -0.0768**
(0.0358) (0.0378) (0.0386)
Number of meals that pupils take in a day -0.00321 0.0166 0.0132
(0.0183) (0.0180) (0.0181)
Payment to school extra tuition 0.0409** 0.0105 0.0186
(0.0194) (0.0206) (0.0211)
Number of household members -0.00423 -0.00202 0.00156
(0.00427) (0.00413) (0.00378)
Log of pupil teacher ratio -2.669*** -3.034*** -3.361***
(0.409) (0.372) (0.366)
Log of classsize 0.712 1.541*** 0.975
(0.730) (0.447) (0.653)
School fenced dummy (1 if school is fenced and 0 otherwise) -0.115*** -0.0962*** -0.118***
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0183)
Electricity dummy (1 if there is an electricity infrastructure in the village and 0
otherwise)
-0.0980*** -0.109*** -0.117***
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0180)
Tarmac road dummy (1 if there is a tarmac road and 0 otherwise) -0.0369 -0.0367 -0.0136
(0.0261) (0.0251) (0.0267)
Log of pupil teacher ratio (Quadratic) 0.829*** 0.917*** 0.991***
(0.0922) (0.0836) (0.0842)
Log of classsize (Quadratic) -0.378** -0.621*** -0.411***
(0.175) (0.110) (0.157)
Log of pupil teacher ratio (Cubit) -0.0661***-0.0728***-0.0784***
(0.00683) (0.00618) (0.00636)
Log of classsize (Cubic) 0.0401*** 0.0638*** 0.0407***
(0.0135) (0.00899) (0.0123)
Constant 6.000*** 5.404*** 6.217***
(0.890) (0.459) (0.780)
Observations 3,778 3,728 3,706
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table [4.2] The Balancing Property of covariates for estimation sample  
 
PTA ratio<=16
Male household head -0.01266 -0.0239 -0.0024 -0.01 0.0263 0.0347
[ -0.358 ] [-1.91]* [ -0.144 ] [-0.77] [ 0.728 ] [2.71]***
Year dummy 0.07 0.0046 0.02786 0.0195 -0.1 -0.0238
[ 1.704 ] [0.26] [ 0.706 ] [1.09] [ -2.324 ] [-1.34]
Age of mother 0.024 -0.0846 -0.3334 -0.3145 0.2533 0.3951
[ 0.038 ] [-0.38] [ -0.612 ] [-1.35] [ 0.552 ] [1.72]*
Age of pupils 0.0903 0.225 0.04896 0.0868 -0.207 -0.3195
[ 0.692 ] [4.54]*** [ 0.486 ] [1.69]* [ -1.598 ] [-6.33]***
Years of education for mother -0.1876 -0.753 -0.1615 -0.356 0.5595 1.1335
[ -0.616 ] [-6.44]*** [ -0.716 ] [-2.93]*** [ 1.926 ]* [9.56]***
Years of education for father -0.24426 -0.8031 -0.2212 -0.404 0.5926 1.2326
[ -0.648 ] [-6.43]*** [ -0.852 ] [-3.11]*** [ 1.972 ]* [9.73]***
Asset (phone) -0.0279 -0.0925 0.01088 -0.0046 0.0367 0.101
[ -0.866 ] [-6.72]*** [ 0.29 ] [-0.32] [ 1.064 ] [7.20]***
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Polythene) -0.0038 0.0009 0.00168 0.0021 0.0007 -0.003
[ -0.376 ] [0.43] [ 0.434 ] [0.97] [ 0.218 ] [-1.39]
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Iron sheet) -0.00568 -0.0082 0.00642 0.0073 -0.003 0.0014
[ -0.258 ] [-1.01] [ 0.344 ] [0.88] [ -0.138 ] [0.17]
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Timber) -0.00536 -0.0313 -0.0169 -0.0164 0.0398 0.0486
[ -0.284 ] [-3.27]*** [ -0.78 ] [-1.66]* [ 1.318 ] [4.99]***
Quality of house wall (1 if material is Stone/bricks) -0.03102 -0.0742 0.0135 0.0012 0.0323 0.0763
[ -1.116 ] [-6.18]*** [ 0.534 ] [0.10] [ 1.066 ] [6.22]***
Number of meals that pupils take in a day -0.01958 -0.0544 -0.0089 -0.022 0.0484 0.0782
[ -0.49 ] [-3.33]*** [ -0.314 ] [-1.30] [ 1.206 ] [4.70]***
Payment to school extra tuition 0.02142 -0.0002 -0.0108 -0.0189 -0.012 0.0187
[ 0.61 ] [-0.01] [ -0.342 ] [-1.16] [ -0.292 ] [1.16]
Number of household members 0.1096 0.2274 -0.0258 -0.0223 -0.155 -0.2156
[ 0.744 ] [3.27]*** [ -0.156 ] [-0.31] [ -0.814 ] [-3.04]***
Log of pupil teacher ratio -0.03436 0.039 -0.0333 -0.021 0.0502 -0.0202
[ -0.972 ] [2.72]*** [ -0.808 ] [-1.41] [ 1.426 ] [-1.38]
Log of classsize 0.0482 0.0481 -0.0121 -0.0119 -0.07 -0.0386
[ 1.304 ] [2.98]*** [ -0.22 ] [-0.71] [ -1.372 ] [-2.34]**
School fenced dummy (1 if school is fenced and 0 otherwise) 0.03348 -0.0311 -0.0098 -0.0247 -0.002 0.0566
[ 0.81 ] [-1.93]* [ -0.27 ] [-1.49] [ -0.056 ] [3.45]***
Electricity dummy (1 if there is an electricity infrastructure in the village and 0
otherwise)
-0.06998 -0.1966 0.03278 0.0078 0.063 0.1977
[ -1.854 ] [-11.58]*** [ 0.818 ] [0.44] [ 1.652 ]* [11.38]***
Tarmac road dummy (1 if there is a tarmac road and 0 otherwise) -0.02464 -0.0677 0.0046 0.0002 0.0365 0.0705
[ -0.914 ] [-5.71]*** [ 0.156 ] [0.02] [ 1.148 ] [5.82]***
Log of pupil teacher ratio (Quadratic) -0.28448 0.2423 -0.2324 -0.13 0.3756 -0.1263
[ -1.21 ] [2.52]** [ -0.816 ] [-1.31] [ 1.614 ] [-1.28]
Log of classsize (Quadratic) 0.34274 0.3331 -0.0809 -0.0655 -0.532 -0.2839
[ 1.21 ] [2.75]*** [ -0.178 ] [-0.52] [ -1.316 ] [-2.29]**
Log of pupil teacher ratio (Cubit) -1.72664 1.1265 -1.2063 -0.597 2.0978 -0.594
[ -1.428 ] [2.27]** [ -0.786 ] [-1.16] [ 1.756 ]* [-1.17]
Log of classsize (Cubic) 1.89122 1.7456 -0.361 -0.2191 -3.16 -1.609
[ 1.104 ] [2.42]** [ -0.112 ] [-0.29] [ -1.246 ] [-2.18]**
26 <PTA ratio
AdjustedNot Adjusted Not Adjusted Adjusted Not AdjustedAdjusted
0 <PTA ratio <=16 16 <PTA ratio<=26 
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Figure 2, 3, 4 the estimated dose response function for grade four, three and two pupils 
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Figure 5 Central Province, Grade 4 pupil school average                  Figure 6 Coast Province, Grade 4 pupil school average  
 
 
 
Figure 7 North Eastern Province, Grade 4 pupil school average            
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Figure 9 Western Province, Grade 4 pupil school average                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Eastern Province, Grade 4 pupil school average 
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Figure 10 Rift Valley Province, Grade 4 pupil school average  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Nyanza Province, Grade 4 pupil school average  
 
